War with Maduro would carry immense risks
Nearly 36 years ago, the U.S. invaded Panama to dislodge its strongman, General Manuel Noriega. A force of 27,000 overcame Panamanian resistance in a matter of just two weeks.
Noriega, transported to the U.S., was tried and convicted for drug trafficking and money laundering. He spent 18 years in a Miami prison until he was extradited to France in 2010 to face additional money laundering charges.
Like President George H.W. Bush, who called Noriega a “drug kingpin,” President Trump has accused Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro of drug trafficking and linked him to criminal gangs. Trump has made no secret of wanting to remove Maduro from power.
He has ramped up the pressure on Maduro by authorizing the sinking of seven Venezuelan ships in Caribbean international waters and an eighth in the Pacific, accusing the crews of drug smuggling. With the exception of two Colombians citizens who were repatriated, all aboard the ships perished in the attacks.
Trump has authorized the largest deployment of U.S. forces in the Caribbean since the 1989 operation — 10,000 troops, four surface warships, drones, surveillance aircraft, and a Marine Amphibious Ready Group, plus 2,200 Marines accompanied by tactical aviation. On Oct. 15, Trump announced that he had authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations inside Venezuela. He even said he was considering air strikes on Venezuelan territory — a threat backed up by U.S. fighters and bombers flown off Venezuela’s coast.
Maduro, who has no desire to share Noriega’s fate, had already announced in August that he was mobilizing 4.5 million militia members to defend the country against a “gringo” invasion. Many observers have discounted his announcement as mere rhetoric. Others have pointed out that the Venezuelan military is both ill-equipped and poorly trained.
Nevertheless, just as Maduro is not planning to give up the presidency, an attack on Venezuela is not going to be a reprise of America’s fortnight war against Panama. For starters, Venezuela has twelve times the land area of Panama, and its population is about eight times greater. Indeed, Maduro’s militia alone is larger than Panama’s entire population.
Nor is it clear that the Venezuelan opposition will work alongside the U.S. to dethrone the Venezuelan dictator. Venezuelans may instead put their politics aside and defend their homeland, much like Russians, despite their recent suffering under Stalin’s Great Purge, united in 1941 to fight the German invasion.
America’s twenty-year experience in Afghanistan, like that of the Soviets in the late twentieth century, demonstrates how a determined force can still hold out against a far more technically capable foreign invader and ultimately prevail. And Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invaders at the very outset of what is now approaching four years of war also demonstrates that the strategy of decapitation that succeeded in 1989 did not yield similar results in February 2022.
Finally, the possibility that other countries will come to Venezuela’s aid cannot be ruled out. Colombian President Gustavo Petro suggested last month that any U.S. attack on Venezuela would be considered an attack on all Latin America. The leftist Petro, whose term of office does not end for another seven months, has had several verbal clashes with Trump and may be prepared to send his far more capable and mostly U.S.-trained troops to assist Maduro.
Brazil’s President Lula da Silva, who has clashed with Trump on trade and on the prosecution of his political rival Jair Bolsonaro, might also come to Maduro’s aid. Lula has said he prefers to have a “civilized” relationship with the U.S. That hope could easily dissipate in the face of an attack on its northwestern neighbor. Involvement by Brazil’s military — far more capable than that of Venezuela — would further dim chances of a quick U.S. victory.
Finally, Maduro’s friends in China — who thus far, like Russia, have supported him with statements rather than armaments — could change their stance if the U.S. actually invades. Whatever military equipment Beijing provides Caracas would certainly enhance Venezuela’s prospects for resisting America’s far superior military might.
The current deployments in the Caribbean are already reducing U.S. presence elsewhere in the world. Should America become enmeshed in a war that does not end quickly, Chinese president Xi Jinping might calculate that a distracted Washington will not be in a position to prevent his forces from seizing Taiwan’s small offshore islands, or even to help defend against an attack on Taiwan itself.
Maduro is a brutal dictator, and Trump is doubtless correct about his role in drug trafficking. Nevertheless, regime-change policies have not worked out well for the U.S. in the twenty-first century. The White House should therefore carefully consider the real risks of going much beyond its current pressure tactics that aim to make the stubborn dictator leave his office and perhaps his country as well.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
